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Universal	Basic	Services:	A	theoretical	
and	moral	framework	
Ian	Gough		
	
Forthcoming	in	Political	Quarterly.	
	
	
	
Introduction	
	
The	extended	crisis	of	what	we	can	still	call	the	welfare	state	has	provoked	proposals	for	
radical,	encompassing	reform.	The	gap	between	the	rich	and	poor	is	widening,	children	go	to	
school	hungry	and	dirty,	and	life	expectancy	rates	are	beginning	to	fall.	More	people	are	in	
work,	but	work	doesn’t	pay	and	the	so-called	'social	security'	system	provides	nothing	of	the	
sort.	Since	the	financial	crash	alternatives	have	increasingly	encompassed	economic	
restructuring.	Following	growing	awareness	of	the	climate	crisis	some	also	include	radical	
environmental	reform.	Let	us	summarise	the	present	predicament	as	fragmented	and	
degraded	welfare	plus	financialised,	short	termist	and	unsustainable	capitalism.	
	
Universal	Basic	Income	(UBI)	is	perhaps	the	most	all-embracing	radical	alternative.	UBI	has	
become	increasingly	popular	on	left,	right	and	centre	as	a	unitary	solution	to	the	social	and	
economic	fractures	and	failures	in	modern	society.	According	to	the	Compass	group	‘There	is	
no	single	silver	bullet	policy	to	create	a	Good	Society	–	but	basic	income	is	the	closest	there	
is’.	But	it	has	also	attracted	growing	criticism,	both	normative	and	pragmatic.
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	I	share	many	
of	the	critiques	but	I	do	not	rehearse	them	here.	Instead	I	develop	the	case	for	an	
alternative	–	Universal	Basic	Services	(UBS).	
	
The	idea	of	UBS	was	originally	developed	by	the	Institute	for	Global	Prosperity	in	2017.
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	It	
proposed	a	wider	range	of	free	public	services	that	enable	every	citizen	to	live	a	larger	life	by	
ensuring	access	to	certain	levels	of	security,	opportunity	and	participation.	Here,	services	
mean	collectively	generated	activities	that	serve	the	public	interest,	basic	means	essential	
and	sufficient	rather	than	minimal,	enabling	people	to	flourish	and	participate	in	society,	
and	universal	means	that	everyone	is	entitled	to	services	that	meet	their	needs,	regardless	
of	ability	to	pay.	The	existing	National	Health	Service	(NHS)	and	public	education	are	obvious	
examples.	The	original	proposal	for	UBS	advocated	an	extension	of	this	model	of	provision	
to	–	at	least	-	Shelter,	Nutrition,	Transport	and	Information.		
		
Yet	money	is	fungible	so	government	money	transfers	including	UBI	permit	people	to	spend	
income	on	whatever	they	want.	Public	services	are	not	fungible	but	deliver	specific	activities	
or	provisions.	UBS	is	less	in	tune	with	market	ideology	than	UBI.	Unless	a	robust	justification	
is	spelt	out	the	case	for	UBS	will	be	continually	undermined	by	appeals	to	respect	consumer	
sovereignty	and	market	democracy.	The	purpose	of	this	paper	is	to	ground	the	case	for	UBS	
in	a	broader	conceptual	and	moral	framework.	
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The	argument	is	in	three	parts.	The	first	sets	out	a	theory	of	the	common	human	needs	we	
all	share	and	the	satisfaction	of	which	is	necessary	for	a	flourishing	life.	The	second	develops	
the	idea	of	the	‘foundational	economy’	as	a	provisioning	system	for	meeting	these	needs.	
The	final	part	restates	the	case	for	social	rights	or	entitlements	to	the	satisfaction	of	basic	
needs	and	for	collective	responsibilities	to	meet	them.	It	makes	the	case	for	public	provision	
across	four	goals:	equality,	efficiency,	solidarity	and	sustainability.		
	
Shared	needs	
	
The	essence	of	the	argument	is	to	counterpose	common	human	needs	to	the	single-minded	
pursuit	of	individual	wants.	Economic	theory	gives	ontological	and	epistemic	preference	to	
the	wants	individuals	happen	to	have,	whether	these	are	assumed	to	derive	from	an	
individual’s	innate	preferences	or	their	cultural	and	economic	environment.	To	gain	a	strong	
purchase	on	UBS	we	must	turn	to	two	other	schools	of	thought	–	Capability	theory	and	Need	
theory.		
	
The	capability	approach,	first	elaborated	by	Amartya	Sen,	conceives	human	wellbeing	in	
terms	of	the	range	of	substantive	freedoms	and	opportunities	that	people	possess.	These	
‘capabilities’	in	turn	rest	on	the	‘functionings’	of	people;	‘an	achievement	of	a	person:	what	
she	or	he	manages	to	do	or	to	be’.	Capability	is	therefore	the	set	of	functionings	that	a	
person	can	achieve	–	their	freedom	to	lead	one	type	of	life	or	another.	Unlike	Sen,	Martha	
Nussbaum’s	capabilities	approach	goes	on	to	list	ten	‘human	functional	capabilities’	and	is	
content	to	identify	these	in	a	cross-cultural	way:	life;	bodily	health;	bodily	integrity;	senses,	
imagination	and	thought;	emotions;	practical	reason;	affiliation;	other	species;	play;	and	
control	over	one’s	environment.	Within	these	she	identifies	three	‘core’	capabilities	-	of	
affiliation,	bodily	integrity	and	practical	reason.	But	to	justify	this	prioritisation	in	her	later	
book	Frontiers	of	Justice,	she	relies	heavily	on	the	language	of	need.
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Human	need	theory	has	been	advanced	from	a	variety	of	perspectives.	In	a	book	with	Len	
Doyal
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	I	argue	that	all	individuals,	everywhere	in	the	world,	at	all	times	present	and	future,	
have	basic	needs	for	participation,	health	and	autonomy.	These	must	be	met	in	order	for	
people	to	avoid	harm,	to	participate	in	society	and	to	reflect	critically	upon	the	conditions	in	
which	they	find	themselves.	The	universality	of	need	rests	upon	the	belief	that	if	needs	are	
not	satisfied	then	serious	harm	of	some	objective	kind	will	result.	This	is	not	the	same	as	
subjective	feelings	like	anxiety	or	unhappiness.	It	refers	to	functions	not	feelings.	Basic	
needs	are	then	the	universal	preconditions	for	effective	participation	in	any	form	of	social	
life.	Similarly,	Sarah	Clark	Miller
5
	develops	a	notion	of	objective,	inescapable,	inevitable,	
urgent,	and	universal	needs,	which	if	unmet	will	result	in	the	harm	of	compromised	agency.	
	
In	turn	these	basic	needs	always	require	certain	‘intermediate	needs’	that	are	again	
universal.		A	list	of	these	would	include	material	factors	-	water,	nutrition,	shelter,	education	
and	healthcare;	non-material	factors	–security	in	childhood,	significant	primary	
relationships,	physical	and	economic	security;	and	embracing	the	two,	a	safe	environment.		
The	internationally-agreed	2015	Sustainable	Development	Goals	provide	another	approach	
to	shared	needs	–	a	‘crowd-sourced’	method	to	determine	universal	global	foundations	for	a	
just	and	sustainable	economy.	
	
Alongside	universality,	human	needs	have	two	other	characteristics.	First,	they	are	plural	
and	non-substitutable:	they	cannot	be	added	up	and	summarized	in	a	single	unit	of	account.	
One	domain	of	need-satisfaction	cannot	be	traded	off	against	another.	More	education	is	of	
no	immediate	help	to	someone	who	is	ill	through	malnutrition.	Thus	certain	packages	of	
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need	satisfiers	are	necessary	for	the	avoidance	of	harm.	This	is	quite	different	from	
consumer	preferences	in	economic	theory	where	substitutability	is	the	default	assumption:	
given	a	bundle	of	two	goods	it	is	always	possible—by	reducing	the	amount	of	one	
fractionally	and	increasing	the	amount	of	the	other		fractionally—to	define	a	second	bundle	
between	which	a	consumer	is	‘indifferent’.	Our	alternative	has	direct	relevance	to	the	case	
for	UBS.	Meeting	different	needs	and	fostering	different	capabilities	requires	a	set	of	distinct	
activities	and	services,	not	simply	the	balm	of	more	money.	
	
Second,	needs	are	satiable.	It	is	highly	likely	that	the	amount	of	intermediate	needs	required	
to	achieve	a	given	level	of	participation,	health	and	autonomy	diminishes	as	their	quantity	
increases,	eventually	plateauing.	Thus	the	contribution	of	calories,	dwelling	space,	even	
levels	of	childhood	security,	to	basic	needs	can	be	satiated.	The	distributive	principle	
entailed	by	human	need	theory	is	sufficiency:	to	bring	all	individuals	up	to	such	a	threshold	
(though	this	can	be	defined	in	different	ways).		
	
But	while	basic	needs	are	universalisable,	need	satisfiers	-	the	goods,	services,	activities	and	
relationships	required	to	meet	needs	in	any	given	social	setting	-	almost	always	vary	across	
different	historical,	geographical	and	social	contexts.	This	leads	to	a	philosophical	and	
methodological	dilemma:	how	in	a	democracy	can	these	satisfiers	be	collectively	identified?	
Need	and	capability	approaches	challenge	the	logical	and	moral	priority	accorded	to	
peoples’	wants/	preferences	in	orthodox	welfare	economics.	They	counterpose	a	collective	
alternative	to	individual	consumer	preferences.	Yet	at	the	same	time,	there	is	a	danger	of	
officials,	experts	or	politicians	determining	for	people	what	they	need.		
	
In	brief,	identifying	need	satisfiers	requires	a	‘dual	strategy’:	citizen	involvement	and	
decentralised	practices	of	various	kinds,	informed	by	relevant	scientific	findings	and	
professional	expertise.	Applying	this	perspective,	we	can	envisage	in	general	terms	a	three-
stage	process:	define	generic	need	satisfiers	utilising	an	externally	verifiable	stock	of	codified	
knowledge	for	example,	knowledge	about	nutrition,	epidemiology,	or	planetary	boundaries;	
complement	this	by	drawing	on	the	experientially	grounded	understanding	that	people	have	
in	their	everyday	lives	in	specific	contexts;	and	confront	and	attempt	to	resolve	inevitable	
disagreements	that	result	in	forums	as	open,	as	democratic,	and	as	free	of	vested	interests	
as	possible.	Humans	do	arbitrate	highly	complex	decision-	making	in	large	groups,	as	
evidenced	in	Elinor	Ostrom’s	research	on	the	communal	management	of	common	resources	
and	the	observation	of	large	scale	societies	across	the	world	today.	In	sum,	what	is	required	
is	a	form	of	procedural	rationality.	Determining	need	satisfiers	entails	a	problem-solving	
process	rather	than	a	preference-aggregating	one.
6	
	
Provisioning	systems		
	 	
Goods	and	services	to	satisfy	needs	must	be	produced,	distributed	and	utilised.	The	
production,	allocation	and	distribution	of	many	need	satisfiers	has	migrated	from	intimate	
to	public	spheres,	of	which	the	production	of	commodities	within	markets	is	the	dominant	
form.	This	paper	recognises	the	critical	role	that	will	continue	to	be	played	by	private	
markets,	but	disputes	the	dominant	economic	discourse	that	imputes	exclusive	virtue	to	
market	provision	while	denigrating	collective	provision.		
	
We	take	issue	with	the	idea	of	the	economy	as	a	uniform	space	within	which	nameless	and	
substitutable	commodities	are	produced,	exchanged	and	consumed.	The	idea	of	non-
substitutable	need	satisfiers	entails	a	different	conception	of	the	economy	as	a	network	of	
‘systems	of	provision’.
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	The	links	between	production	and	consumption	are	structured	in	
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distinct	ways	for	different	groups	of	commodities.	Thus	there	is	the	food	system,	the	energy	
system,	the	housing	system,	the	education	system,	the	care	system,	the	transport	system,	
and	so	on.	Each	provisioning	system	comprises	physical	elements	(infrastructure,	
technology,	land	use,	supply	chains)	and	social	elements	(social	institutions	such	as	markets	
and	states,	social	relationships,	and	social	norms	and	cultures).	But	each	displays	a	different	
structure	and	dynamic.		
	
This	understanding	of	the	modern	economy	has	been	extended	and	deepened	in	the	idea	of	
the	‘foundational	economy’	developed	by	the	‘Manchester	School’	over	the	last	decade.
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The	material	foundational	economy	directly	delivers	a	range	of	essential	need	satisfiers	in	
contemporary	market	economies.	The	main	components	are:	pipe	and	cable	utilities	(piped	
water,	waste	water	and	sewerage,	electricity	supply,	domestic	piped	gas	and	
telecommunications	-	both	copper	wire	and	mobile);	transport	infrastructure	comprising	
railways,	roads,	filling	stations,	car	retailing	and	servicing	and	all	public/social	vehicles	such	
as	trains	and	buses;	food	production,	processing	and	the	distribution	network	including	
supermarkets;	and	retail	banking	services	and	payments	systems.	Alongside	these	is	the	
providential	foundational	economy,	essentially	the	entire	welfare	state:	health	care,	
education,	social	care,	police	and	emergency	services	and	public	administration.	Housing	is	a	
critical	sector	that	sits	across	both	domains.	The	entire	foundational	economy	including	the	
welfare	state	accounts	for	about	50%	of	both	employment	and	expenditure	in	the	UK	and	
across	Europe.		
	
These	services	are	all	‘mundane’.	They	are	taken	for	granted	until	they	fail.	‘Between	7am	
and	9am	every	workday	morning	in	Europe	most	citizens	use	goods	and	services	that	draw	
on	economic	and	social	systems	which	are	the	everyday	infrastructure	of	civilised	life’.
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	They	
differ	from	other	sectors	of	the	economy	in	several	ways:	benefits	are	delivered	through	
infrastructure,	networks	and	branches,	as	opposed	to	the	purchase	of	individual	
commodities;	these	sectors	are	relatively	sheltered	from	international	competition;	and	they	
provide	collective,	shared	services	and	other	activities	in	the	public	interest,	for	mutual	
benefit.		
	
There	is	clearly	a	parallel	between	the	frameworks	of	human	needs	and	provisioning	
systems.	Both	recognise	the	irreducible	heterogeneity	of	consumption,	the	multi-faceted	
nature	of	human	needs	and	the	variety	of	systems	on	which	we	all	depend.	Both	recognise	
the	importance	of	shared	systems	and	mutual	benefits.	Potentially	they	can	both	justify	the	
idea	of	local	economies	under	more	local	control.	‘The	historical	development	of	the	
foundational	economy	is	…	a	kind	of	practical	working	out	of	the	theory	of	human	needs	and	
capabilities,	because	foundational	provision	amounts	to	a	kind	of	immanent	(implicit)	moral	
theory	of	citizenship’.
8		
Together	they	provide	the	conceptual	foundations	for	UBS.	
	
Table	1	provides	a	provisional	map	of	the	links	between	universal	basic	needs,	contemporary	
clusters	of	need	satisfiers,	and	modern	provisioning	systems.	The	second	column	provides	a	
provisional	list	of	contemporary	need	satisfiers.	It	is	clear	that	these	basic	provisioning	
systems	are	presently	distributed	across	both	the	private	and	public	sectors	in	a	shifting	
pattern.	This	raises	the	question,	what	is	the	justification	for,	and	the	appropriate	realm	of,	
the	public	sector?	Can	and	should	free	universal	provision	be	extended	through	the	public	
realm?	
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Table	1.	Linking	needs	and	provisioning	systems:	The	potential	components	of	UBS		
	
Universal	needs	 Contemporary	need	
satisfiers	
Provisioning	systems	
	 	 	
Nutrition	 Adequate	nutritious	diets;	
food	security	
Agriculture,	food	processing	and	
food	retailing	systems:	‘from	field	to	
fork’	
Shelter	 Adequate,	secure,	
affordable	housing	
Housing:	land,	building,	owning,	
letting	
Energy	 Utilities	
Water	and	sanitation	 Utilities	
Social	participation:	
Education/	
Information/	
communication	
	
Schooling	and	adult	
education	
Education	and	training	systems	
Phone,	computer	and	
internet	connection	
Telecommunications	
Access	to	effective	and	
healthy	means	of	transport	
Road,	rail	etc	infrastructure	
Public	transport	services	
Health:	prevention,	cure,	
care	
	
Public	health	
Medical	services	
Social	care	
Public	health	services	
National	health	services	
Social	care	services	
Physical	security	 Emergency	services	 Emergency	services	
Income	security	
	
	
Employment	
	
Decent,	secure	job	
	
Income	maintenance	 Social	security;	private	insurance	
Money/payment	systems	 Retail	banking	
Note:	
The	middle	column	denotes	contemporary	need	satisfiers	-	the	potential	components	of	
UBS.	An	attempt	has	been	made	in	this	table	to	separate	out	concepts	and	measures	
pertaining	to	individuals	and	concepts	and	measures	pertaining	to	collectivities,	and	to	list	
only	the	former.	Thus	desirable	collective	goals	such	as	gender	equality,	environmental	
sustainability	and	social	inclusiveness	are	not	regarded	as	basic	needs,	but	as	general	
societal	preconditions	for	their	satisfaction.
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Collective	responsibilities	and	social	entitlements	
	
The	essential	argument	for	public	provision	of	some	kind	is	that	markets	and	charity	cannot	
guarantee	the	meeting	of	needs.	Only	public	authority	can	provide	equitable	entitlements	to	
need	satisfiers.	Since	the	Second	World	War	universal	needs	have	provided	an	essential	
grounding	for	appeals	to	social	rights:	moral	or	legal	claims	possessed	by	‘right-bearers’	that	
corresponding	‘duty-bearers’	must	take	seriously.	It	is	usual	here	to	distinguish	‘negative’	
civil	and	political	rights	from	‘positive’	socio-economic	rights.		The	former	entail	a	duty	of	
forbearance	and	protection,	for	example	rights	to	freedom	of	expression	and	against	
discrimination;	the	latter	entail	a	duty	of	assistance	and	provision,	for	example	rights	to	
education	or	healthcare.	Both	sets	of	rights	can	be	traced	back	to	the	1948	Universal	
Declaration	of	Human	Rights,	and	have	been	elaborated	and	further	specified	since	then.		
	
In	the	West	social	rights	have	provided	a	fundamental	moral	argument	for	welfare	states	
that	recognise	collective	obligations	to	meet	the	basic	needs	of	citizens	for	health,	care,	
education,	a	minimum	income	and	so	on.	Though	they	are	subject	to	constant	critiques	and	
counter-movements,	there	is	within	them	an	enduring	(if	attenuated)	sense	of	social	
obligation	to	meet	the	‘needs	of	strangers’,	whose	unmet	needs	we	do	not	directly	witness	
and	can	do	nothing	individually	to	satisfy.	At	present	these	obligations	end	at	national	
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borders.	Large	flows	of	refugees	and	economic	migrants	are	today	questioning	who	counts	
as	‘strangers’	and	placing	new	strains	on	national	welfare	systems.	A	process	is	underway	to	
reimagine	social	citizenship,	based	on	plural	identities	and	rights	conferred	on	residents	
rather	than	on	passport-holders.	
	
Social	citizenship	is	anchored	in	both	ethical	and	practical	considerations.	There	is	a	moral	
dialectic	in	the	ascription	of	rights	and	obligations.	It	is	inconsistent	to	ascribe	rights	to	
persons	in	a	social	group	without	also	ascribing	responsibilities,	duties	or	obligations	to	
group	members	for	realising	those	rights.	And	it	is	inconsistent	to	ascribe	responsibilities	to	
an	individual	or	group	without	ensuring	that	they	have	the	wherewithal	to	discharge	them.	
Feminist	revisions	of	the	relationship	between	needs	and	obligations	have	recognised	
people	are	vulnerable	as	well	as	capable.	Dependence	on	others	is	a	normal	part	of	every	
life,	so	for	significant	periods	we	must	depend	on	others	to	provide	for	us,	as	we	must	for	
them.	Caring	is	the	process	of	‘responding	to	another’s	needs	by	understanding	their	self-
determined	ends,	adopting	those	ends	as	one’s	own,	and	advancing	them	in	an	effort	to	
cultivate,	maintain,	or	restore	their	agency’.
5
	Obligations	thus	involve	not	only	avoidance	
from	harm,	but	also	the	promotion	of	capacities	for	autonomy	and	self-determination.			
	
The	argument	thus	far	is	that	there	exist	a	number	of	intrinsic,	non-substitutable	needs	that	
have	a	high	moral	claim	to	satisfaction	and	that	should	be	guaranteed	to	strangers	via	social	
rights	of	citizenship	and	residence.		
	
The	guarantee	of	entitlements	need	not	entail	direct	provision	of	services	by	state	agencies.	
Indeed	from	1980	onwards	this	system	has	been	broken	up	in	three	main	ways:	non-state	
providers	have	been	encouraged	(both	for-profit	and	not-for-profit),	non-state	sources	of	
funds	expanded,	and	decisions	about	what,	how	much	and	how	to	provide	have	been	
devolved	to	intermediate	organisations	or	to	end-users.	At	the	same	time	much	of	the	
foundational	economy,	like	energy,	water,	telecommunications	and	public	transport,	has	
been	extensively	privatised	and	outsourced.		
	
Much	of	this	needs	to	be	reversed	to	achieve	UBS,	but	that	does	not	require	a	return	to	a	
‘pure	public’	model.	Entitlements	to	UBS	can	also	be	guaranteed	using	a	menu	of	
interventions	including	regulation,	standard	setting	and	monitoring,	taxation	and	subsidies.	
But	the	unifying	proposal	is	to	advocate	directly	collective	solutions,	as	opposed	to	providing	
income	support	and	leaving	provisioning	to	market	forces.	
	
To	develop	this	argument	the	case	for	collective	provision	to	meet	needs	can	be	made	on	
four	main	grounds:	equity,	efficiency,	solidarity,	and	sustainability.		
	
Equity	and	the	‘social	wage’.		The	value	of	free	and	accessible	public	services	to	the	
individual	recipient	is	frequently	called	the	‘social	wage’	because	it	replaces	costs	that	the	
individual	would	otherwise	have	to	pay	for	out	of	personal	income.	In	the	absence	of	public	
provision,	for	individuals	on	low	incomes	meeting	basic	needs	is	likely	to	consume	the	
majority	of	their	income.	If	not,	basic	needs	go	unmet	with	both	individual	and	social	costs.	
If	bought	on	the	market	these	goods	and	services	take	up	a	larger	share	of	household	
income	as	we	descend	the	income	scale.		
	
This	is	a	major	argument	for	free	public	provision	of	necessities	financed	from	taxation.	Even	
if	the	total	tax	system	of	a	country	is	broadly	proportional	to	income,	as	is	the	current	UK	tax	
system,	the	overall	result	will	be	progressive	–	the	relative	size	of	net	income	plus	services	
will	increase	as	we	descend	the	income	scale.	On	average,	in	OECD	countries,	existing	public	
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services	are	worth	the	equivalent	of	a	huge	76	per	cent	of	the	post-tax	income	of	the	
poorest	group	compared	with	just	14	per	cent	of	the	richest.	Public	services	reduce	income	
inequality	in	OECD	countries	by	an	average	of	20	per	cent.
9
	Free	provision	of	necessities	
automatically	targets	lower	income	households,	without	the	disincentive	effects	that	often	
result	from	money	transfers.	Allocation	according	to	need	and	citizenship,	not	market	
demand,	automatically	serves	redistributive	social	goals.	
	
Efficiency.	The	argument	that	markets	enhance	productive	efficiency	is	well	known	and	valid	
for	many	types	of	goods	and	services.	The	dominant	argument	in	economic	theory	accuses	
public	services	of	inefficiency,	due	to	lack	of	competition	coupled	with	the	vested	interests	
of	bureaucrats	and	professions.	These	alleged	shortcomings	were	used	to	justify	introducing	
market	rules	into	public	services	from	the	1980s	onwards.		
	
Yet	the	obverse	failures	of	unregulated	economic	markets	to	satisfy	consumer	wants	are	
also	well	known,	including	tendencies	to	monopoly,	the	inability	of	markets	to	supply	public	
goods,	the	self-defeating	production	of	positional	goods,	and	the	inefficiency	or	diswelfares	
caused	by	meeting	wants	in	commodified	forms.	Transaction	costs	are	often	higher	for	both	
consumers	and	providers:	the	search	costs	for	customers	of	comparing	different	pension	or	
utility	providers,	the	administrative	costs	of	drawing	up	appropriate	contracts,	the	policing	
and	enforcement	costs	of	monitoring	large	private	companies	such	as	Serco	and	G4S.	
Several	sectors	of	the	material	foundational	economy,	notably	the	networked	sectors,	have	
large	economies	of	scale,	meaning	they	are	‘natural	monopolies’.	Moral	hazards	are	
encountered	when	profit	incentives	combine	with	unequal	knowledge	in	markets.	
Competition	between	multiple	providers,	customer	choice	for	service	users	and	
conventional	cost-efficiency	criteria	for	measuring	success	have	largely	failed	to	improve	
social	outputs	let	alone	social	outcomes.	
	
There	are	further	advantages	to	a	public	–	rather	than	market-based	-	system	of	service	
provision.	Where	efficiency	is	assessed	in	narrow	output	terms,	calculations	overlook	the	
multiple	dimensions	of	value,	the	many	ways	in	which	value	is	experienced	and	how	it	
accrues.	The	concept	of	‘social	return	on	investment’	(SROI)	has	been	developed	over	the	
last	decade	and	adopted	by	government	in	the	2012	Social	Value	Act,	which	instructs	public	
service	commissioners	to	consider	how	to	‘improve	the	social,	economic	and	environmental	
well-being	of	the	relevant	area’.	Applying	social	value	analysis	to	an	assessment	of	service	
efficiency	means	taking	account	of	longer-term	and	indirect	effects,	as	well	as	shorter-term,	
direct	ones.		This	does	not	sit	easily	with	a	market-based	system.	If	staff	delivering	meals	to	
people	who	are	housebound	take	time	to	sit	and	chat	with	them,	this	may	reduce	their	
sense	of	social	isolation	and	generally	improve	their	wellbeing,	but	it	will	increase	costs	by	
demanding	additional	staff	time.	
	
Solidarity.		The	concepts	of	shared	needs	and	collective	responsibilities	embody	the	idea	of	
solidarity,	and	the	practice	of	UBS	has	potential	to	develop	and	strengthen	solidarity.	Here	
we	take	solidarity	to	mean	feelings	of	sympathy	and	responsibility	between	people	that	
promote	mutual	support.		It	is	an	inclusive	process,	not	just	within	well-acquainted	groups	
but	also,	crucially,	between	people	who	are	‘strangers’	to	each	other.		It	involves	collective	
action	towards	shared	objectives.
10
	There	is	a	growing	literature	on	the	ways	in	which	
neoliberal	capitalism,	based	on	individualism,	choice	and	competition,	weakens	the	values	of	
social	citizenship	and	undermines	solidarity.		
	
UBS	calls	for	collective	policy	and	practice:	sharing	resources	and	acting	together	to	deal	
with	risks	and	problems	that	people	cannot	cope	with	alone.		It	is	not	something	that	can	be	
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achieved	by	individuals	or	groups	simply	fending	for	themselves	and	pursuing	their	own	
interests.	This	is	reflected,	for	example,	in	the	EU’s	long-standing	goal	of	economic	and	
social	‘cohesion’:	combining	a	free	market	economy	with	‘a	commitment	to	the	values	of	
internal	solidarity	and	mutual	support	which	ensures	open	access	for	all	members	of	society	
to	services	of	general	benefit	and	protection.’	In	the	same	spirit,	the	Fabian	Society	has	
argued	that	ending	poverty	requires	a	‘solidarity	settlement’	that	would	profoundly	reshape	
the	welfare	system	by	enshrining	‘equal	citizenship’	and	fostering	‘a	sense	of	mutual	
interdependence.’
11
		
	
Some	have	argued	that	public	services	‘crowd	out’	social	capital	by	inhibiting	informal	caring	
networks,	mutual	trust	and	social	norms	that	favour	civil	commitment	and	trustworthiness.		
However,	evidence	contradicts	this	hypothesis,	finding	instead	that	Nordic-style	welfare	
regimes,	where	there	are	more	universal	services,	tend	to	have	higher	levels	of	bonding	and	
bridging	social	capital.
12
			
	
Sustainability.		One	of	the	particular	weaknesses	of	much	public	policy	is	short-termism:	
taking	little	account	of	how	major	drivers	of	social,	economic	and	environmental	
transformation	will	remould	the	way	the	satisfaction	of	needs	is	experienced	and	the	
resources	available	to	meet	them.	Yet	public	services	have	a	greater	potential	to	pursue	
sustainability	goals	than	programmes	to	disburse	funds	for	consumer	expenditure.	In	
particular	they	could	play	a	greater	role	in	prevention:	‘action	to	reduce	the	probability	of	a	
risk	occurring’.	The	case	for	preventive	public	policy	is	essentially	twofold:	it	is	better	for	
human	wellbeing	to	prevent	harm	than	to	deal	with	its	consequences	and	it	promises	
financial	savings	to	expensive	and	hard-pressed	welfare	states.
13
		
	
This	is	most	apparent	in	facing	the	most	profound,	indeed	existential,	threat	to	
contemporary	public	policy	-	climate	collapse	and	extreme	environmental	stress.	The	urgent	
necessity	to	move	away	from	unsustainable	economic,	social	and	environmental	practices	
provides	a	novel	justification	for	extending	universal	public	services,	in	three	directions
14
.	
First,	public	provision	of	services	strengthens	the	capacity	of	communities	to	adapt	to	or	
cope	with	severe	climatic	and	environmental	stress.	The	impact	of	Hurricane	Katrina	on	the	
poor	and	black	populations	of	New	Orleans	(in	contrast	to	the	population	of	Cuba,	affected	
by	the	same	hurricane)	demonstrated	the	importance	of	collective	services.	Second,	public	
services	can	play	a	vital	role	in	decarbonising	the	economy	in	a	just	way.	For	example,	Green	
New	Deal	programmes	to	retrofit	the	vast	bulk	of	the	housing	stock	will	require	public	
planning,	finance	and	management.	They	will	be	needed	to	ensure	a	‘just	transition’	to	
lower	carbon	living,	not	simply	a	green	capitalist	transition	that	will	load	costs	onto	the	
poorest	people	and	communities.		
	
Third,	UBS	can	play	a	vital	role	in	switching	the	entire	economy	from	an	obsession	with	
growth	to	a	concern	for	human	wellbeing	within	planetary	limits.	Public	provisioning	
systems	for	healthcare	and	education	are	better	able	than	market	systems	to	promote	
sustainable	consumption,	to	implement	national	strategies	for	reducing	GHG	emissions	and	
to	coordinate	sustainable	practices	such	as	active	travel	and	local	food	procurement.	For	
example,	the	mainly	privately-funded	US	healthcare	system	directly	accounts	for	8	per	cent	
of	emissions	in	the	US,	compared	with	3	per	cent	of	UK	emissions	directly	stemming	from	
the	NHS.	This	is	due	both	to	the	greater	macro-efficiency	and	lower	expenditure	shares	of	
health	in	the	UK,	and	to	lower	emissions	per	pound	or	dollar	spent,	presumably	as	a	result	of	
better	allocation	of	resources	and	procurement	practices.	There	is	some	cross-national	
evidence	that	more	extensive	and	generous	welfare	states	are	better	suited	to	adopting	and	
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implementing	pro-environmental	policies,	especially	where	they	embody	ideas	about	shared	
needs	and	collective	responsibilities.
12
		
	
Conclusion		
	
The	case	for	Universal	Basic	Services	made	here	is	one	part,	but	an	essential	part,	of	a	
rejection	of	turbo	consumer	capitalism	and	a	renewal	of	social	citizenship:	a	shift	from	
customers	and	consumers	to	residents	and	citizens.	To	achieve	this	will	require	a	resolute	
confrontation	with	the	ontology	and	morality	of	the	current	economic	model.	The	
ontological	ground	is	the	existence	of	core	human	needs	that	require	collective	
responsibilities	and	a	renewed	foundational	economy	to	fulfill.	The	normative	justification	is	
the	superior	potential	of	UBS	to	secure	human	flourishing	via	greater	equality,	efficiency,	
collective	solidarity	and	long-term	sustainability.		
	
The	political	argument	is	that	the	implementation	of	Universal	Basic	Services	can	achieve	
results	that	are	superior	to	a	system	of	unconditional	cash	payments	(a	UBI	scheme)	coupled	
with	markets	for	commodified	services.	Of	course	this	leaves	open	the	question,	why	not	
advocate	both	UBI	and	UBS?	There	is	not	the	space	here	to	confront	that	question	properly	
but	it	embraces	consequential	and	ethical	arguments.	A	universal	unconditional	living	
income	would	require	punitive	levels	of	taxation.	By	focusing	wholly	on	individual	income,	
UBI	would	threaten	public	provision	of	collective	consumption,	which	of	course	is	why	many	
on	the	libertarian	right	support	it.	UBS	is	fiscally	more	modest	and	discriminatory.	Common	
human	needs	recognise	the	social	foundations	of	life	and	the	role	of	contribution	to	a	
collective	cause:	‘from	each	according	to	their	ability’	as	a	well	as	‘to	each	according	to	their	
needs’.	In	this	and	other	ways	UBS	embodies	quite	distinct,	and	I	would	argue	ethically	
superior,	ideas	of	economy,	society,	sustainability	and	social	solidarity.	
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